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CORPORATIONS: LIABILITY OF
ACCOMMODATION DIRECTORS:
MUELLER v. J.I.M.
CONSTRUCTION
CO. (CAL. 1964)
The decision in the case of Meuller v. The J.I.M. Construction
now pending before the District Court of Appeal, Division
One, should be of great interest to members of the California Bar.
The question involved concerns the liability of an attorney and his
two office secretaries as accommodation directors of a corporation
formed for a client. During the process of incorporation, in order
to expedite the filing of the Articles of Incorporation, the attorney
and the two secretaries became directors of record. Shortly after the
articles were filed, the three directors resigned. Several months thereafter the corporation became indebted to a lumber company for
goods sold and delivered at the request of the Construction Company.
Because there were no funds to satisfy a judgment against the Construction Company, suit was instituted against the defendants as
partners doing business under a corporate name.
The plaintiffs, assignees of the Lumber Company, alleged that
the corporate entity should be disregarded and that defendants should
be held liable on the authority of Minton v. Caveney.' Upon submission of the pleadings the defendants moved for summary judgment.
The motion was granted, and the plaintiffs have appealed.
The case has possibilities of significantly affecting the fashion
in which many California lawyers attend to the business of forming
corporations for their clients. A widespread custom provides that
lawyers and their employees, for the purpose of expediting matters,
may become the first directors or incorporators of a new corporation, as in this case. Later, as here, when the formalities are attended
to, they resign their directorships and turn the business over to
those who requested the incorporation originally. Should liability
eventually attach on the facts of this case, a great many members of
the California bar may have cause for concern as to their status
as incorporators of small companies that eventually flounder.
The case of Minton v. Caveney,8 upon which the appellant
Co.,1

1 Mueller v. J.I.M. Construction Co., Civil Number 152349, Superior Court,
Santa Clara County (Mar. 15, 1964).
2 56 Cal. 2d 576, 15 Cal. Rptr. 641, 364 P.2d 473 (1961). See Note, 2 SANTA
CLARA LAw. 90 (1962).

3 Id.
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principally relies, involved a situation that differs in many respects
from the Mueller case. In Minton, the defendant, a lawyer, helped
to incorporate the Seminole Hot Springs Corporation. The only property owned by the Company at the time of incorporation was a leasehold interest in a swimming pool which it intended to operate for
profit. The plaintiff's daughter drowned in the pool, and eventually
the plaintiff recovered a judgment against the corporation for
$10,000. The judgment was returned unsatisfied. The plaintiffs then
sued Caveney, the lawyer, on the theory that he was an incorporator
and director, and that this was a case in which the corporate entity
should be disregarded. The facts showed however, that Caveney was
an equitable owner of one third of the outstanding shares and that,
in addition, he had "actively participated in the conduct of the
business. ' The Supreme Court refused to hold Caveney liable at
this time as he had not been a party to the litigation that adjudged
the Seminole Hot Springs Corporation liable to the plaintiff. The
majority opinion in Minton holds,
It is immaterial whether or not he accepted the office of director as
an "accommodation" with the understanding that he would not exercise any of the duties of a director. A person may not in this manner
divorce the responsibilities of a director from the statutory duties and
powers of that office. 5
The dissent states,
I dissent from any implication that mere professional activity by an
attorney at law, as such, in the organization of a corporation, can constitute any basis for a finding that the corporation is the attorney's
alter ego, or that he is otherwise personally liable for its debts ....6
These two unfortunate statements have given rise to the suggestion
that the attorney and.his secretaries in the Mueller case should be
held liable, If so, then the result will be an extension of the theory
of disregard of the corporate entity to hold liable one who is neither
a stockholder nor a manager.
The separate corporate entity received strong recognition in the
latter part of the last century in the English case of Broderip v.Saloman.7 In that case the owner of an established business incorporated
and assumed the position of a large secured creditor. When the
company became insolvent the owner-manager held a preferred
position as to the other creditors. When he was sought to be held
4

Id. at 580, 15 Cal. Rptr. at 643, 364 P.2d at 474.

5 Id.
6 Id.

at 582. See LA=, CORPORATIONs, 243 (1959), for discussion of the courts'
frequent lenient treatment of so-called inactive directors.
7 L.R. (1895)

2 Ch. 323, 1897 A.C. 22.
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personally liable on the corporation's debts, the House of Lords
took the position that the corporation was distinct from its shareholders. In other words, the debts of the corporation were not the
debts of the one who owned it.
The courts have not followed the strict position taken in this
case. California courts have not hesitated to disregard the corporate
entity when the facts seemed to demand it. In the numerous cases
that have pierced the corporate veil in California, two requirements
have evolved: 1) There must be a unity of ownership and management; 2) an inequitable result will occur if the entity is not disregarded.' This rule has been most recently applied in the case of
Auer v. Frank,' wherein it was stated, ". . . both these elements must
be found to exist before the corporate existence will be disre0
garded."'
In determining whether or not to ignore the corporate entity, a
number of factors are ordinarily considered. Among these may be
inadequate capitalization, the treatment by an individual of the
assets of the corporation as his own, the holding out by an individual
that he is himself liable for the debts of the corporation, the confusion of individual and corporate records, and many other indications
of a lack of separateness between the individual and the corporation." A noted writer maintains that the expression "disregard of the
corporate entity" is loose phraseology. He claims that the problems in
this area are problems in determining the limitations "upon the
exercise of the legal privilege of separate capacity in view of its
proper ends and functions."' 2
When proper incorporation procedures have been followed, the
entity is created. The problem for the courts is to indicate exactly
how far they will allow this privilege to be exercised. When the
use of the entity becomes abuse, it will be disregarded, and the
owners will be held liable. This is because the owners are the ones
given the privilege of limiting their liability to the extent of
corporate assets.
8 Associated Vendors, Inc. v. Oakland Meat Co., 210 Cal. App. 2d 825, 833, 26
Cal. Rptr. 806, 812 (1962). This case very thoroughly explores the doctrine of disregard of the corporate entity and its use in California, and contains references
therein to almost every case of significance on the subject in this state.
9 227 A.C.A. 422, 38 Cal. Rptr. 684 (1964). This case was decided in the same
court that is hearing the appeal in the Mueller case.
10 Id. at 433.
11 Associated Vendors, Inc. v. Oakland Meat Co., 210 Cal. App. 2d 835, 837,
23 Cal. Rptr. 806, 807, (1962). This case contains references to authority for each
proposition cited in this paragraph. See footnote 8, supra.
12 BALLENTINE, PRIVATE CORPORATIONs 26 (1927).
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In the Mueller case there is essentially a policy decision facing
the courts. If the entity is disregarded and the former directors
held, new law will be made regarding the liability of directors of
corporations. The policy to justify such a role would place a strong
emphasis upon the form of the transaction. The reasoning would
suggest that those who deal with a corporation do so in reliance upon
the names of the directors of record. Authority for such a decision
would presumably be predicated on the authority of the Minton case.
If on the other hand the attorney and his two secretaries are
not held liable, the result will be in accord with the established
13
weight of authority in California and elsewhere. No case has been
found where a non-owner has been held liable to the creditors of a
corporation on any legal theory that disregards the corporate entity.
The requirement of ownership of shares is undoubtedly not necessary
in every case; 14 it would seem, however, that there must be more of
an attempt to avoid the specific requirement of ownership, in the nature of a sham, before unity of ownership and management is
eliminated as a prerequisite to disregarding the entity. It is also
probably desirable to disregard the entity and hold liable only those
who are evading responsibilities the law would otherwise have imposed upon them. On the facts of the Mueller case there seems to be
little reason for holding the defendants liable, particularly when they
were only performing the ministerial functions incident to forming
the corporation. The summary judgment should be affirmed.
C. Duane Carlsmith
13 In an examination of some 85 California cases involving the issue of disregard of the corporate entity, in none of these was there even a suggestion that the
entity be disregarded so as to hold a director who is not an owner liable. Additionally,
the text writers do not seem to have discussed the possibility. See for instance,
LATTIN, CORPORATIONS 64 (1959),
BALLENTINE, PRIVATE CORPORATIONS 26 (1927),
FLETCHER, CYC. CORP. § 25 (Rev. vol. 1963). It should be noted that one defendant in
a California case was relieved from liability on the basis that he owned none of the
stock. Riddle v. Leuschner, 51 Cal. 2d 574, 334 P.2d 107 (1959).
14 For instance, in Start v. Coker, 20 Cal. 2d 839, 129 P.2d 390 (1942) one
defendant was held liable when the corporate entity was disregarded on the basis
of ownership of one share out of 150 outstanding shares. In this case however, the
defendant was the wife of the owner of substantially all the rest of the stock, and
the facts indicated that both the husband and the wife devoted substantially all
their efforts in the management of the operation.

